On the Management of Public Opinion (Former Title: On the (Mis-)Use of Information for Public Debate)

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

On the Management of Public Opinion (Former Title: On the (Mis-)Use of Information for Public Debate). / Patacconi, Andrea; Vikander, Nick.

2013.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Patacconi, A & Vikander, N 2013 'On the Management of Public Opinion (Former Title: On the (Mis-)Use of Information for Public Debate)'. <https://sites.google.com/site/nickvikander/home/files/Mis-Use_JPE_Rev.pdf?attredirects=0&d=1>

APA

Patacconi, A., & Vikander, N. (2013). On the Management of Public Opinion (Former Title: On the (Mis-)Use of Information for Public Debate). https://sites.google.com/site/nickvikander/home/files/Mis-Use_JPE_Rev.pdf?attredirects=0&d=1

Vancouver

Patacconi A, Vikander N. On the Management of Public Opinion (Former Title: On the (Mis-)Use of Information for Public Debate). 2013.

Author

Patacconi, Andrea ; Vikander, Nick. / On the Management of Public Opinion (Former Title: On the (Mis-)Use of Information for Public Debate). 2013.

Bibtex

@techreport{e98fe74360ee4ed584bbd48ed05a20dc,
title = "On the Management of Public Opinion (Former Title: On the (Mis-)Use of Information for Public Debate)",
abstract = "Policymakers often motivate their decisions by disclosing information. While this can hold the government to account, it may also give policymakers an incentive to {"}…fix the evidence{"} around their preferred policy. This paper considers a model of biased information gathering where the government can in‡fluence the workings of an agency in charge of collecting information. We examine how different disclosure rules and the degree of independence of the government agency affect citizen welfare. Our main result is that insulating the agency from political pressure, so that its information is always unbiased, may not be socially optimal. A biased information gathering process can curb the government{\textquoteright}'s tendency to implement its ex ante favored policy, thus mitigating the agency con‡flict between policymakers and the public.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, transparency, accountability, independence, manipulation of information, Faculty of Law",
author = "Andrea Patacconi and Nick Vikander",
note = "JEL Classi…cation: D73, H11, H56.",
year = "2013",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - On the Management of Public Opinion (Former Title: On the (Mis-)Use of Information for Public Debate)

AU - Patacconi, Andrea

AU - Vikander, Nick

N1 - JEL Classi…cation: D73, H11, H56.

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - Policymakers often motivate their decisions by disclosing information. While this can hold the government to account, it may also give policymakers an incentive to "…fix the evidence" around their preferred policy. This paper considers a model of biased information gathering where the government can in‡fluence the workings of an agency in charge of collecting information. We examine how different disclosure rules and the degree of independence of the government agency affect citizen welfare. Our main result is that insulating the agency from political pressure, so that its information is always unbiased, may not be socially optimal. A biased information gathering process can curb the government’'s tendency to implement its ex ante favored policy, thus mitigating the agency con‡flict between policymakers and the public.

AB - Policymakers often motivate their decisions by disclosing information. While this can hold the government to account, it may also give policymakers an incentive to "…fix the evidence" around their preferred policy. This paper considers a model of biased information gathering where the government can in‡fluence the workings of an agency in charge of collecting information. We examine how different disclosure rules and the degree of independence of the government agency affect citizen welfare. Our main result is that insulating the agency from political pressure, so that its information is always unbiased, may not be socially optimal. A biased information gathering process can curb the government’'s tendency to implement its ex ante favored policy, thus mitigating the agency con‡flict between policymakers and the public.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - transparency

KW - accountability

KW - independence

KW - manipulation of information

KW - Faculty of Law

M3 - Working paper

BT - On the Management of Public Opinion (Former Title: On the (Mis-)Use of Information for Public Debate)

ER -

ID: 81611387